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EQUITY AND CORPORATE LAW
Mark J. Loewenstein*
I.

INTRODUCTION

N 1971, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc.,' a case that stands for the simple proposition that
"inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is
legally possible."'2 The inequitable action at issue was the decision of the
directors of Chris-Craft to advance the date of the corporation's annual
meeting to derail the plan of the plaintiff-stockholders to wage a proxy
contest to unseat incumbent management. The Court acknowledged that
the directors had the right under Delaware Corporation Law to advance
the date of the annual meeting but, of course, that did not preclude testing that right against equitable principles. This short opinion-just a few
3
pages in the Atlantic Reporter-has been frequently cited by the courts
and has become a staple in corporate law casebooks.
The contours of the case have been defined over the years. In Lerman
v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,4 a 1980 case, the Chancery Court considered a
challenge to bylaw amendments that allowed the directors to fix the date
of the annual meeting (replacing a bylaw that fixed the date) and required stockholders planning to nominate directors to provide seventy
days advance notice of the names of such nominees. Some time after
adopting these bylaws, the board fixed the annual meeting date for sixtythree days after the board meeting. This foreclosed the ability of the
plaintiff to mount a proxy contest, but the board defended on the basis
that the plaintiff had plenty of time before the board fixed the annual
meeting date to provide the corporation with the required information.
The court rejected this defense, reasoning that "it cannot serve to excuse
the conduct of management if that conduct was both inequitable (in the
sense of being unnecessary under the circumstances) and had the accompanying dual effect of thwarting shareholder opposition and perpetuating
management in office."'5 Lerman may be viewed as an extension of
© Copyright 2015 by Mark J. Loewenstein All Rights Reserved
* Monfort Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author
thanks Dustin J. Rickett for his research assistance in the preparation of this article and
Professor Joan Heminway for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
2. Id. at 439.
3. A search on Westlaw done on May 30, 2015, generated a total of 942 citing references, of which 170 were in judicial opinions.
4. 421 A.2d 906, 907 (Del. Ch. 1980).
5. Id. at 914.
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Schnell because the court provided relief to a party that could have protected itself, but failed to do so. More importantly, the court defined "inequitable" in the broadest possible terms-an action undertaken by the
board of directors that was "unnecessary" under the circumstances.
Schnell was pushed a bit further some ten years later in Hubbard v.
Hollywood Park Realty Enterprises, Inc.,6 a case that also involved an
advance notice bylaw. In this instance, however, there was an important
twist. Stockholders who sought judicial relief from the bylaw provision
had decided to nominate a slate well after the date of the annual meeting
was announced, arguing that actions taken by the board subsequent to
setting the annual meeting date led them to conclude that the corporation
was moving in the wrong direction and needed new leadership. The issue
was thus whether Schnell compelled the board to affirmatively take action to accommodate the plaintiffs. The Chancery Court held that it did:
[C]onsiderations of fairness and the fundamental importance of the
shareholder franchise dictated that the shareholders be afforded a
fair opportunity to nominate an opposing slate, thus imposing upon
the board the duty to waive the advance notice requirement of the
bylaw. And that duty exists, even though concededly the [corporation's] board has acted in good faith 7and took no steps overtly to
change the electoral rules themselves.
Hubbard, therefore, characterizes Schnell as a rather broad fairness
opinion.
A further expansion of Schnell was reflected in Aprahamian v. HBO &
Co.8 and Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc.,9 two other Chancery Court
opinions. In Aprahamian, insurgents waging a proxy contest challenged
the decision of the board of directors to postpone an annual meeting just
before it was to occur, presumably because the incumbent board feared it
would lose the proxy contest. The court announced a rather low threshold
for applying Schnell: the action of the board "does not show that any
significant interests of the stockholders will be served by the postponement."' 10 In Berger, the court applied equitable principles in the context
of an appraisal.'1 The plaintiff complained that there was not enough
time for him to review the materials he received in connection with a
freeze-out merger to decide whether to seek appraisal. The court agreed,
ruling that defendant's conduct was inequitable under Schnell.
Schnell has thus proven to be a useful tool for courts policing inequitable conduct by corporate actors and, incidentally, by those who control
6. Civ. A. No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151, at *243 (Del. Ch. Jan 14, 1991).

7. Id. at *260.
8. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
9. 911 A.2d 1164 (Del. Ch. 2006).
10. Aprahamian, 531 A.2d at 1208.
11. Berger, 911 A.2d at 1174; see also, Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022,
1029 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Schnell applied to set aside bylaw amendment requiring unanimous
board approval for significant decisions).
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alternative entities as well. 12 In the nearly forty-five years since Schnell
was decided, however, the Delaware courts have developed other, more
nuanced, tools to address inequitable conduct, principally the duty of
good faith, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Unocal v.

Mesa Petroleum Co. 13 (director action in the context of a potential

change of control), and Blasius Industries,Inc. v. Atlas14 (director action
interfering with stockholder voting). This evolving jurisprudence raises
the questions of whether these "new" tools are superior to Schnell and
whether Schnell can co-exist with them. This essay explores those related
questions.
II.

GOOD FAITH: FIDUCIARY RESTRAINT OR
CONTRACTUAL DUTY?
A.

THE

DuTY

OF GOOD FAITH

Although the mandate that directors of a corporation must act in
"good faith" is long-standing and reflected in many corporation statutes,
including the Model Business Corporation Act, the contours of this duty
were largely unexplored until relatively recently. 15 In the extensive Disney derivative litigation (1998-2006), 16 the Delaware courts began the
development of the modern law of the duty of good faith, at least insofar
as Delaware law is concerned. In its 2006 opinion, the Delaware Supreme
Court cited with approval the definition of good faith articulated in the
Chancery Court's opinion:
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply
the duties of care and loyalty, in the narrow sense that I have discussed them above, but all actions required by a true faithfulness and
devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A
failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts
with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, dem12. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., 40 A.3d 839, 849 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(citing Schnell with approval in relation to a limited liability company); Twin Bridges Ltd.
P'ship v. Draper, No. Civ.A. 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007)
(applying Schnell to a limited partnership).
13. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
14. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
15. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Diverging Meaning of Good Faith, 34 DEL. J. CoRP.
L. 433, 438-40 (2009) (describing the case law preceding the Disney litigation); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2006)
("An important development in corporate law is the explicit recognition in recent cases
that corporate managers-directors and officers-owe a duty of good faith in addition to
their duties of care and loyalty.")
16. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998),
affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub. nom. Brehm v. Eisner (Disney II), 746 A.2d 244,
261-64 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275,
753-56 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693,
753-56 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (Disney V).
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onstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other
examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are
the most salient. 17
Tellingly, both the Chancery Court and Supreme Court opinions stated
the doctrine open for future
that this definition was not exclusive,1 leaving
8
expansion, presumably as necessary.
Another key development in the duty of good faith occurred seven
19
years later, when the Delaware Supreme Court decided Stone v. Ritter.
In this case, the Court clarified the taxonomy of fiduciary duties, determining that the duty to act in good faith is not an independent fiduciary
duty, but is an element of the duty of loyalty.20 Thus, a breach of the duty
of good faith can only indirectly give rise to liability. 2 1 As the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court that the directors had not breached
their duty to act in good faith, court watchers were denied the opportunity to see how a breach might "indirectly" give rise to damages. Subsequent cases do not add clarity.
In any event, this jurisprudence is not unrelated to Schnell. It appears
that the directors' decision in Schnell to advance the date of the annual
meeting was not undertaken to advance the best interests of Chris-Craft.
Indeed, it was undertaken to allow the directors to retain their positions.2 2 Under the test articulated in Disney, then, directors in Schnell
may have violated the duty to act in good faith. Moreover, this version of
good faith dovetails nicely with the notion of loyalty: the directors of
Chris-Craft acted in their self-interest.
The non-exclusivity of the definition suggests that the concept of equity
that animates Schnell might easily be replaced with the duty of good faith.
The overarching concept-true faithfulness and devotion to the interests
of the corporation and its shareholders-can easily accommodate actions
that thwart the ability of shareholders to exercise their voting franchise.
Despite this nice tool to address "inequitable conduct," the Delaware
courts have been somewhat reluctant to rely on it. A stark example of
23
this is Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC. Gerber is best

known for its discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which is discussed in great detail in the next section. More interesting, for present purposes, is that the duty of good faith, whether characterized as an element of the duty of loyalty or not, made a brief and
inconsequential appearance in the Supreme Court's opinion.
17. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755-56).
18. Disney [V, 907 A.2d at 756; Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
19. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
20. Id. at 369-70.
21. Id.
22. Motive is a key element in determining whether an actor has breached the duty of
good faith. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624
A.2d 1199, 1208 (Del. 1993).
23. 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 2013), overruled on other grounds, Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc.,
76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013).
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Gerber arose out of a challenge by a limited partner to certain related
party transactions implemented by the general partner and its affiliates.
Like corporate directors, the general partner of a limited partnership
owes fiduciary duties to the entity and, indirectly, to the limited partners.
While there is a good deal more freedom for an alternative entity to contract around fiduciary duties, the Delaware courts have insisted that the
drafter meet a rather high standard to achieve a waiver of fiduciary duties. Moreover, when such duties have been effectively waived, the courts
have generously employed the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to afford some measure of relief to the disadvantaged parties.
In Gerber, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed a lower court decision that dismissed the action and held that the plaintiff had stated a
claim under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the
course of reaching that conclusion, however, the Court characterized the
limited partnership agreement as creating a "contractual fiduciary duty of
good faith, ' '24 because it required the general partner to act in the best
interests of the partnership when it made a business decision for the partnership. On the facts of this case, the Court apparently could have concluded that the general partner breached this duty, but, instead, chose to
rely on the implied covenant.
Arguably, the Court opted for the least restrictive doctrine when addressing what might be characterized as inequitable conduct on the part
of the general partner. Were the Court to have relied on a fiduciary concept, it would have marked an expansion of the definition, as applied,
that it had endorsed in Disney. Both Disney and Stone, the two most
prominent Delaware Supreme Court cases discussing the duty of good
faith, involved fact patterns alleging, essentially, that the boards of directors failed in their duty of oversight. In Disney, the board approved an
employment agreement and, later, a settlement, that the plaintiff alleged
was disastrous for Disney. In Stone, the plaintiff alleged that the board's
failure to properly oversee the company's operations resulted in a violation of federal law and large penalties. In neither case could the plaintiffs
sustain their burden of proof that the defendants' conduct amounted to a
conscious disregard of their responsibilities, a rather high bar for plaintiffs to overcome. Were the Court to apply the abstract definition of good
faith that it articulated in Disney and Stone-true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders-it could set
aside any action (or, perhaps, relief for inaction) that results in inequity.
Wisely, the Court has chosen not to go in that direction and, instead, has
developed the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tool to
police overreaching, especially in the context of alternative entities and
most commonly in cases involving related party transactions. Despite the
apparent narrowness of this doctrine-at least insofar as corporate governance disputes are concerned-it may have salience in resolving such
disputes.
24. Id. at 412.
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THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

Gerber provides an instructive case in how the Delaware Supreme
Court views the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which a
recent Chancery Court described as follows:
The implied covenant is a limited gap-filling tool to infer contractual
terms to which the parties would have agreed had they anticipated a
situation they failed to address; it is not a "free-floating duty" or "a
substitute for fiduciary duty analysis." Put differently,
"[flair dealing" is not akin to the fair process component of entire
fairness, i.e., whether the fiduciary acted fairly when engaging in
the challenged transaction as measured by duties of loyalty and
care ....It is rather a commitment to deal "fairly" in the sense of

consistently with the terms of the parties' agreement and its purpose. Likewise "good faith" does not envision loyalty to the contractual counterparty, but rather faithfulness to the scope,
purpose, and terms of the parties' contract. Both necessarily turn
on the contract itself and what the parties would have agreed upon
had the issue arisen when they were bargaining originally.
Additionally, when a contract confers discretionary rights on a party,
the implied covenant requires that party to exercise its discretion
reasonably. And "what is 'arbitrary' or 'unreasonable'-or conversely 'reasonable'-depends on the parties' original contractual
obligations" and "reasonable expectations at the time of concannot
tracting." Fundamentally, therefore, "[t]he implied covenant
'25
be invoked to override the express terms of the contract.
This definition, which is representative of the way the Delaware courts
have described the concept, is narrow compared to the Schnell concept of
inequitable conduct and the Disney concept of the duty of good faith. Yet
it is not without force, and it is useful as a tool to police misconduct, as
Gerber itself demonstrates. Its salience for corporate law, however, depends on how one characterizes the fundamental corporate documentsthe certificate of incorporation and bylaws. To apply the implied covenant doctrine in the corporate context, then, a court would have to conceive of the certificate of incorporation and bylaws as contracts and,
while there is much literature that characterizes them as such, 26 the courts
have not. I return to the wisdom of such an approach in Part IV below,
after considering the shortcomings of the Schnell doctrine and its relationship to the iconic corporate law cases of Unocal and Blasius.
25. In re Encore Energy Partners LP Unitholder Litig., C.A. No. 6347-VCP, 2012 WL
3792997, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2012) (footnotes omitted).
26. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (1982); William A. Klein, The Modern Business
Organization:BargainingUnder Constraints,91 YALE L.J. 1521, 1522-24 (1982); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976); Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 783 (1972).
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III.

THE PROBLEMS WITH SCHNELL

There are several problems with the Schnell doctrine: it is indeterminate, it is inconsistent with the notion of private ordering, it overlaps with
other legal doctrines, and it increases litigation without a corresponding
benefit. I will discuss each in turn.

A.

SCHNELL Is INDETERMINATE

The Delaware courts have expressed the importance of certainty: to
facilitate private ordering, the law should be clear to corporate actors.
The Delaware Supreme Court expressed this in no uncertain terms in a
footnote to Willams v. Geier:
In addition to the specter of impermissible judicial legislation, the
relief requested by Williams [setting aside an amendment to the certificate of incorporation and a recapitalization], if granted, would introduce an undesirable degree of uncertainty into the corporation
law .... Directors and investors must be able to rely on the stability
and absence 2 7of judicial interference with the State's statutory
prescriptions.
Somewhat paradoxically, the Court ended this footnote citing Schnell approval, the very case that creates uncertainty.
Perhaps the best, but not the only, example of Schnell's uncertainty can
29
be found in Singer v. Magnavox Co.28 and its progeny. Relying partially
on Schnell, Singer established the principle that a freeze-out merger may
be set aside as inequitable and a breach of the fiduciary duty that the
majority owes to the minority if the merger is undertaken merely to eliminate the minority stockholders. The case is commonly characterized as
one that requires the majority to demonstrate there was a corporate business purpose for the merger. 30 The precedent was short-lived. In 1983,
just six years after it decided Singer, the Court reversed course and held,
in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,31 that no such purpose need be shown. Instead, the Court held that the majority stockholder bears the burden of
proving that the merger was entirely fair to the minority stockholders, but
that the purpose of the merger was not an element of fairness. The Court
said that in light of this fairness test, together with an expanded appraisal
remedy announced in the case and an affirmation of the broad discretion
of the Chancellor to provide relief "as the facts of a given case may dictate," 32 the business purpose test was no longer needed. The Court provided no additional explanation, but the overruling of Singer speaks
27. 671 A.2d 1368, 1384 & n.36 (Del. 1996).
28. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), overruled in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
29. PrincipallyRoland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. Int'l
Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).

30. See, e.g., R.

FRANKLIN BALoTrI AND JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF

CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,

31. 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
32. Id. at 715.

§ 9.37 (2015).
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strongly to the indeterminacy of Schnell: that which is inequitable one
day, ceases to be such a few years later.
A flip-flop like the shift from Singer to Weinberger seems inevitable
with a doctrine as fuzzy as Schnell. Consider the observation of former
Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey 33 reflecting on the doctrine in a 2004 law
review article: "The tension between deference to director flexibility in
decision making and the need for judicial oversight is often a defining
tension. The complexity of the issues and the variety of highly textured
fact situations require a delicate balance in fiduciary duty jurisprudence. '34 This statement foreshadows the difficult task that any court
faces and cannot help but lead to inconsistent results. For instance, in
Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc. 3 plaintiff appealed a decision by the Chancery Court holding that under Delaware law, a corporation could "initiate
a reverse stock split and selectively dispose of the fractional interests held
by stockholders who no longer hold whole shares."'3 6 The Court refused
to apply Schnell and noted that applicable Delaware law did not forbid
such disparate treatment. The Court wrote that "[w]hile principles of equity permit this Court to intervene when technical compliance with a statute produces an unfair result, equity and equality are not synonymous
concepts in Delaware General Corporation Law. Moreover, this Court
should not create a safeguard against stockholder inequality that does not
appear in the statute. '37 In contrast to Applebaum, the Minnesota Supreme Court did provide relief under the Schnell doctrine to a minority
shareholder complaining of the unfairness of a reverse stock split. 3 8
The indeterminacy of Schnell is further demonstrated by the terms that
the Delaware courts use to describe the test. For instance, Alabama ByProducts Corp. v. Neal,39 a 1991 Delaware Supreme Court opinion, indicates the Court's unease with the potential broadness of the Schnell precedent. The Court was faced with an argument that Schnell ought to
provide some relief in the context of what the plaintiffs characterized as
unfair dealing in an appraisal proceeding. The Court declined the invitation, writing that Schnell "should be reserved for those instances that
threaten the fabric of the law, or which by an improper manipulation of
the law, would deprive a person of a clear right."'40 This stringent test
stands in stark contrast to the actual application of Schnell, some examples of which are noted in the Introduction to this article. Consider just
one example-Hubbard-where the Chancery Court held that Schnell
imposed a duty on the board of directors to waive an advanced notice
33. Chief Justice of Delaware Supreme Court from 1992-2004.
34. E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. DiGuglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1416 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
35. 812 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002).
36. Id. at 882.
37. Id. at 886.
38. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 802 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 2011).
39. 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
40. Id. at 258 n.1 (emphasis added).
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bylaw so that the plaintiffs could mount a proxy contest, even though
there was no finding that the board set the date of the annual meeting to
adversely affect the plaintiffs. Indeed, at the time the date of the annual
meeting was set, the plaintiffs had no plan to challenge the incumbent
the fabric
board. Can it fairly be said that the board's inaction threatened
41
of the law and deprived the plaintiffs of a clear right?
The fluid definition of inequitable conduct has given rise to other uncertainties in its application, primarily, the question of whether the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant acted with scienter.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the case law does not provide clear guidance. In
Accipiter Life Sciences Fund, L.P. v. Helfer,42 for instance, plaintiff
claimed that the corporation buried the announcement of an annual
meeting in a press release primarily devoted to financial result and, consequently, plaintiff missed the opportunity to mount a proxy contest. The
Chancery Court denied relief under Schnell because no one at the corporation "had reason to know" that the plaintiff intended to nominate di43
rectors when the decision was made to announce the annual meeting.
Thus, plaintiff lost because it failed to demonstrate that defendant acted
to interfere with plaintiff's plans. Other cases suggest a similar requirement of intent. 44 In contrast to Accipiter, a 1997 Chancery Court decision
flatly held that "[t]o set aside the election results on the basis of inequitable manipulation of the corporate machinery, it is not required that scienter, i.e., actual subjective intent to impede the voting process, be
45
shown."
B.

SCHNELL

IS

INCONSISTENT WITH PRIVATE ORDERING

Delaware courts frequently distinguish corporations from alternative
entities by characterizing the latter as "contractual entities," while the
former are subject to numerous statutory mandates. 4 6 Indeed, Delaware's
alternative entities statutes direct the courts to "give the maximum effect
41. Among other cases in which the Delaware courts suggested that Schnell may apply
yet one may doubt that the "fabric of the law" was threatened are Klaassen v. Allegro Dev.
Corp., 106 A.3d 1035 (Del. 2014) (deceptive conduct); ATP Tour Inc.v. Deutscher Tennis
Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014) (fee shifting bylaw); City of Providence v. First Citizens
BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229 (Del. Ch. 2014) (forum selection bylaw); Esopus Creek
Value LP v. Hauf, 913 A.2d 593 (Del. Ch. 2006) (filing of a bankruptcy petition).
42. 905 A.2d 115 (Del. Ch. 2006).
43. Id. at 126.
44. E.g., Brody v. Zaucha, 697 A.2d 749 (Del. 1997); Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int'l, Inc.,
940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008); Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enter., Inc., Civ. A. No.
11779, 1991 WL 3151 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991).
45. Linton v. Everett, No. 15219, 1997 WL 441189, at *9 (Del. Ch. 1997).
46. E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286,291 (Del. 1999) ("The basic
approach of the Delaware [LLC] Act is to provide members with broad discretion in drafting the Agreement and to furnish default provisions when the members' agreement is silent."); Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. Civ. A. 16788, 2001 WL 1045643, at
*8 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that under the Delaware partnership law, investors should carefully read partnership agreements before investing); MARTIN I. LUBAROFF & PAUL ALTMAN, DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

§ 1.2 (2015).
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to the principle of freedom of contract. '47 While there is truth to this
characterization, it overstates the difference. In fact, alternative entities
are subject to mandatory terms and corporate actors do have considerable freedom to shape their relationship. For instance, as to the former,
under Delaware law a member of a limited liability company has the right
to certain information about the company48 and an operating agreement
cannot disclaim the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 49
While these might seem like rather narrow limitations on the freedom of
contract, in fact a robust jurisprudence has developed around the implied
covenant, nearly making it a de facto substitute for mandatory fiduciary
duties. 50 On the other hand, amendments to the Delaware corporate code
have greatly increased the contractual freedom of corporate actors, including provisions that allow the certificate of incorporation to disclaim
the directors' monetary liability for breach of their duty of care 51 and
limit the reach of the duty of loyalty. 52
What is important here, whether the entity is a corporation or an alternative entity, is that the law has moved decisively in the direction of private ordering, especially in Delaware and, more generally, around the
country. Schnell is inconsistent with this trend. It says that private ordering is fine, to a point, but the court will set aside the result of private
ordering when it determines that an unfair result would ensue. And, as
noted above, the parameters of this intervention are nearly impossible to
discern.
C.

SCHNELL OVERLAPS WITH OTHER DOCTRINES:
UNOCAL AND BLASIUS

As discussed above, the Schnell doctrine overlaps with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the duty of good faith. But there
are other longstanding doctrines in Delaware law that could be invoked
in lieu of Schnell. Consider a situation in which directors take some action
that influences a vote by stockholders and has the effect of entrenching
the directors in office. Say, for instance, that pursuant to an agreement
with a potential acquirer, the target board agrees to allow the stockholders to vote on a recapitalization proposal that would, among other things,
displace the target board of directors. If the directors engage in some sort
of manipulative conduct that affects, or is intended to affect, the outcome,
their conduct could be challenged under Schnell, Unocal, or Blasius. Unocal would be triggered because the board's actions arguably thwarted a
47. E.g., Delaware Limited Liability Company Act,
1101(b)
48.
49.
50.

DEL. CODE. ANN.

tit. 6, § 18-

(West 2015).
Id. § 18-305.
Id. § 18-1101(c).
See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Alternative Entities in Delaware - Reintroduction of

Fiduciary Concepts by the Backdoor?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS
AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J.

Loewenstein eds., 2015).
51. DEL. CODE ANNq. tit. 6, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015).

52. Id. § 122(17).
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change of control and, therefore, their actions would be subject to judicial
review: the board would bear the burden of proving that their actions
were motivated by a reasonable belief that there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, and that their response was reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. 53 Suppose, however, that the board's actions
were challenged, instead, under Schnell? The manipulative board action,
if it precluded a recapitalization, might well fit within the notion of inequitable conduct. Similarly, under Blasius, when a board acts for the primary purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote, it
bears the burden of proving that it had a compelling justification for its
actions.
There are, of course, many instances of what might be characterized as
inequitable conduct that do not fit within the implied covenant or under
Unocal or Blasius. The implied covenant can be raised only when someone has exercised a right created under a contract; Unocal is triggered
only when there is a possible change of control; and Blasius applies only
when the board's actions have the primary purpose of interfering with the
effectiveness of a stockholder vote. Yet under each doctrine, there is an
important commonality: a beneficiary of a fiduciary duty challenges the
otherwise lawful actions of the fiduciary. This commonality likely
prompted then Vice Chancellor Strine (now Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court) to write about54the overlap of these principles in
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc.:
It would hardly be indiscreet for me to acknowledge yet again the
widely known reality that our law has struggled to define with certainty the standard of review this court should use to evaluate director action affecting the conduct of corporate elections. The results in
the cases make sense, as the decisions do a good job of sorting between situations when directors have unfairly manipulated the electoral process to entrench themselves against insurgents and those
when directors have properly used their authority over the election
process for good faith reasons that do not compromise the integrity
of the election process. The problem that remains though is that
there55 is no certain prism through which judges are to view cases like
this.
In Mercier, Justice Strine noted that Blasius has rarely been applied, be56
cause its compelling justification standard is so difficult to satisfy. His
opinion in Mercier seeks to rationalize Unocal and Schnell, and, basically,
suggests an approach that captures all three cases:
[T]o satisfy the Unocal burden, directors must at minimum convince
the court that they have not acted for an inequitable purpose. Thus
Unocal subsumes the question of loyalty that pervades all fiduciary
duty cases, which is whether the directors have acted for proper rea53. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
54. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007)

55. Id. at 805.
56. Id. at 805-06.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

sons. This aspect of the test57thus addresses issues of good faith such
as were at stake in Schnell.
In Mercier and other cases, 58 it appears that the Delaware courts are recognizing that they have created an overflowing toolbox to deal with inequitable conduct. Their tools require varying burdens of proof and include
varying qualifications, but all ultimately require some demonstration by
the fiduciary that it acted fairly with regard to its beneficiary.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the confines of this symposium, one cannot fully parse the rich jurisprudence that has developed to address alleged misconduct by those who
control a business entity, be it a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company. What has developed, however, and best demonstrated in
Delaware, is a rather haphazard jurisprudence in which the determinative
precedent that resolves the case is somewhat unpredictable. More importantly, the standards of proof for these doctrines differ in a way that cannot easily be explained. In the corporate context, this jurisprudence is
largely developed from Schnell, Unocal, Blasius, and Disney, although the
last of these cases is both the least utilized and potentially the most expansive. In the context of alternative entities, the jurisprudence is an
evolving one, focusing on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The last doctrine is one that could also loom large in corporate
cases, but as yet has not. Interestingly, however, it could provide yet another tool for the judiciary, to the extent that fundamental corporate documents are viewed as contracts between the stockholders and the board
of directors. Given the plethora of extant doctrines to deal with alleged
board misconduct, and the looming possibility of yet another doctrine,
the time is ripe for the judiciary to reconsider its overflowing tool box,
keeping those tools that are most likely to yield consistent, fair outcomes
and removing those that have outlived their usefulness.

57. Id. at 807.
58. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form:A Reassessment of Standards
of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 Bus. LAW 1287 (2001).

